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NEGOTIATION ETHICS:
HOW TO BE DECEPTIVE WITHOUT BEING DISHONEST/
HOW TO BE ASSERTIVE WITHOUT BEING OFFENSIVE
By Charles B. Craver1

I. INTRODUCTION
When experts discuss alternative dispute resolution procedures, they
generally focus on mediation, neutral case evaluation, mini-trials, arbitration,
and other forms of third-party intervention. They ignore the most basic form of
dispute resolution -- negotiation. Most practicing lawyers are not litigators. They
handle family and property matters, trusts and estates, business transactions, tax
controversies, and similar situations. They almost never participate in judicial
or arbitral adjudications. Most of their interactions with other lawyers involve
negotiations. When direct negotiations do not generate mutual accords, they may
request mediation assistance. Even litigators rarely participate in formal
adjudications, due to the high financial and emotional costs and the
unpredictable nature of those proceedings. They thus resolve 90 to 95 percent
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of their cases through direct inter-party discussions or mediator-assisted
settlement talks.
Mediation is not a distinct form of dispute resolution. It is assisted
negotiation. Mediators lack the authority to impose terms on disputants They
only possess the power of personal persuasion. They employ negotiation skills
to reopen blocked communication channels and to encourage further inter-party
discussions. Each mediator negotiates with the parties -- jointly and separately -while the parties negotiate with each other through the mediator and directly
with mediator assistance.
Most attorneys feel some degree of professional discomfort when they
negotiate with other lawyers. If they hope to achieve beneficial results for their
clients, they must convince their opponents that those parties must offer more
generous terms than they must actually offer if agreements are to be generated.
To accomplish this objective, lawyers usually employ some deceptive tactics.
Take for example two parties bargaining over the purchase/sale of a small
business. The Seller is willing to accept $500,000, while the Buyer is willing to
pay $575,000. The Seller’s attorney initially indicates that the Seller must obtain
$600,000, with the Buyer’s lawyer suggesting that the Buyer cannot go above
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$450,000. Once these preliminary offers have been exchanged, the parties are
pleased with the successful way in which they have begun their discussions. Yet
both have begun with position statements designed to mislead the other side.
Have they behaved unethically? Are they obliged to disclose their true
bargaining needs and intentions to preserve their professional reputations? May
they never reject offers they know their clients will accept?
During their subsequent discussions, the Seller’s representative is likely
to embellish the value of the business being sold, while the Buyer’s advocate
undervalues that firm. Must the Seller’s attorney admit that the Seller believes
that future competition from foreign firms is likely to diminish the economic
value of his/her company? Must the Buyer’s lawyer disclose the Buyer’s
innovative plan to enhance the competitive position and future value of this
particular firm? When does the Seller-advocate’s embellishment exceed the
bounds of bargaining propriety? To what extent may the Buyer-representative
disingenuously undervalue the company being discussed? Are the Buyer and
Seller representatives ethically obliged to ensure a “fair” price for the business?
If the Seller is willing to accept less than the Buyer anticipated or the Buyer is
willing to pay more than the Seller imagined, would the lawyer representing the
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other side be duty bound to disclose this fact and attempt to moderate the other
side’s “unrealistic” beliefs?
Some advocates may try to advance client interests through tactics that are
designed to make their opponents feel uncomfortable. They may be rude or
inconsiderate, or may employ overly aggressive bargaining tactics. A few may
resort to abrasive or even hostile behavior they hope will disconcert
unsuspecting adversaries. To what extent may Buyer or Seller representatives
employ highly competitive or adversarial negotiating techniques in an effort to
obtain beneficial client results? At what point would such conduct transcend the
bounds of appropriate behavior?

II. APPROPRIATE AND INAPPROPRIATE MISREPRESENTATIONS
I frequently surprise law students and practitioners by telling them that while
I have rarely participated in legal negotiations in which both participants did not
use some misstatements to further client interests, I have encountered few
dishonest lawyers. I suggest that the fundamental question is not whether legal
negotiators may use misrepresentations to further client interests, but when and
about what they may permissibly dissemble. Many negotiators initially find it

5

difficult to accept the notion that disingenuous “puffing” and deliberate mendacity
do not always constitute reprehensible conduct.
It is easy to exhort legal practitioners to behave in an exemplary manner when
they participate in the negotiation process:
[T]he lawyer is not free to do anything his client might do in the
same circumstances .... [T]he lawyer must be at least as candid
and honest as his client would be required to be .... Beyond
that, the profession should embrace an affirmative ethical
standard for attorneys’ professional relationships with courts,
other lawyers and the public: The lawyer must act honestly and
in good faith. Another lawyer ... should not need to exercise the
same degree of caution that he would if trading for reputedly
antique copper jugs in an oriental bazaar .... [S]urely the
professional standards must ultimately impose upon him a duty
not to accept an unconscionable deal. While some difficulty in
line-drawing is inevitable when such a distinction is sought to
be made, there must be a point at which the lawyer cannot
ethically accept an arrangement that is completely unfair to the
other side ....2
Despite the nobility of such pronouncements, others maintain that “[p]ious and
generalized assertions that the negotiator must be ‘honest’ or that the lawyer must
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use ‘candor’ are not helpful.”3 They recognize that negotiation interactions involve
a deceptive process in which a certain amount of “puffing” and “embellishment”
is expected, as the participants attempt to convince their opponents that they must
obtain better terms than they must actually achieve.4
Observers also note that trustworthiness is a relative concept that is rarely
defined in absolute terms, based on different expectations in diverse situations.
[T]rustworthiness and its outward manifestation -- truth
telling -- are not absolute values. For example, no one tells
the truth all of the time, nor is perpetual truth telling expected
in most circumstances. To tell the truth in some social
situations would be a rude convention. Consequently, when
one speaks of the essential nature of trustworthiness and truth
telling, one
actually is talking about a certain circumstance
or situation in which convention calls for trustworthiness or
truth telling. Thus, a person considered trustworthy and a truth
teller actually is a person who tells the truth at the right or
necessary time.5
Did the Buyer and Seller representatives mentioned above commit ethical
violations when they disingenuously said that the Seller had to obtain $600,000 -while willing to accept $500,000 -- and that the Buyer could not go above
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$450,000 -- while willing to pay $575,000? Some lawyers attempt to circumvent
this moral dilemma by formulating opening positions that do not directly misstate
their actual intentions. For example, the Buyer may indicate that he/she “doesn’t
wish to pay more than $450,000” or the Seller may say that he/she “would not be
inclined to accept less than $600,000” While these preliminary statements may be
technically true, the italicized verbal leaks (“wish to”/”inclined to”) would inform
attentive opponents that these speakers do not really mean what they appear to be
communicating. The Seller does not care whether the Buyer wishes to pay more
than $450,000, but only whether he/she will do so, just as the Buyer does not care
whether the Seller is inclined to accept less than $600,000. If these were true
limitations, the speakers would be likely to use more definitive language
containing no undermining modifiers, such as “I cannot go above or below X.” As
a result of these speaker efforts to maintain their personal integrity, careful
listeners should easily discern the disingenuous nature of the statements being
made by them. The use of these devices to “truthfully” deceive opponents would
thus be unavailing.
When students or practicing attorneys are asked whether they expect opposing
counsel to candidly disclose their true authorized limits or their actual bottom lines
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at the beginning of bargaining interactions, most exhibit discernible discomfort.
They recall the numerous times they have commenced negotiations with
exaggerated or distorted position statements they did not expect their adversaries
to take literally, and they begin to understand the dilemma confronted regularly
by all legal negotiators.
On the one hand the negotiator must be fair and truthful; on the
other he must mislead his opponent. Like the poker player, a
negotiator hopes that his opponent will overestimate the value
of his hand. Like the poker player, in a variety of ways he must
facilitate his opponent’s inaccurate assessment. The critical
difference between those who are successful negotiators and
those who are not lies in this capacity both to mislead and not
to be misled. ... [A] careful examination of the behavior of even
the most forthright, honest, and trustworthy negotiators will
show them actively engaged in misleading their opponents
about their true position.... To conceal one's true position, to
mislead an opponent about one's true settling point is the
essence of negotiation.6
Some writers criticize the use of deceptive negotiating tactics to further client
interests. They maintain that these devices diminish the likelihood of Pareto
optimal results, because "deception tends to shift wealth from the risk-averse to
the risk-tolerant." While this observation is undoubtedly true, it is unlikely to
discourage the pervasive use of ethically permissible tactics that are designed to
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deceive risk-averse opponents into believing they must accept less beneficial terms
than they need actually accept. It is thus unproductive to discuss a utopian
negotiation world in which complete disclosure is the norm. The real question
concerns the types of deceptive tactics that may ethically be employed to enhance
bargaining interests.7 Attorneys who believe that no prevarication is ever proper
during bargaining encounters place themselves and their clients at a distinct
disadvantage, since they permit their less candid opponents to obtain settlements
that transcend the terms to which they are objectively entitled.8
The schizophrenic character of the ethical conundrum encountered by legal
negotiators is apparent in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
were adopted by the House of Delegates in August of 1983. Rule 4.1(a), which
corresponds to EC 7-102(A)(5) under the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, states that “a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement
of material fact or law to a third person.”9 This seemingly unequivocal principle
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is intended to apply to both litigation and negotiation settings.10 An explanatory
Comment under this Rule reiterates the fact that “[a] lawyer is required to be
truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf....” Nonetheless, Comment
Two acknowledges the difficulty of defining “truthfulness” in the unique context
of the negotiation process:
Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of
fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted
conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates
of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a
party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are
in this category .... 11
Even state bars that have not appended this Comment to their version of Rule 4.1
have appropriately recognized the ethical distinctions drawn in that Comment.
Although the ABA Model Rules unambiguously proscribe all lawyer
prevarication, they reasonably, but confusingly, exclude mere “puffing” and
dissembling regarding one’s true minimum objectives.12 These important
exceptions appropriately recognize that disingenuous behavior is indigenous to
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most legal negotiations and could not realistically be prevented due to the
nonpublic nature of bargaining interactions.
If one negotiator lies to another, only by happenstance will the
other discover the lie. If the settlement is concluded by
negotiation, there will be no trial, no public testimony by
conflicting witnesses, and thus no opportunity to examine the
truthfulness of assertions made during the negotiation.
Consequently, in negotiation, more than in other contexts,
ethical norms can probably be violated with greater confidence
that there will be no discovery and punishment.13
One of the inherent conflicts with regard to this area concerns the fact that what
people label acceptable “puffing” when they make value-based representations
during legal negotiations may be considered improper mendacity when uttered by
opposing counsel.
Even though advocate prevarication during legal negotiations rarely results in
bar disciplinary action, practitioners must recognize that other risks are created by
truly dishonest bargaining behavior. Attorneys who deliberately deceive
opponents regarding material matters or who withhold information they are legally
obliged to disclose may be guilty of fraud. Contracts procured through fraudulent
acts of commission or omission are voidable, and the responsible advocates and
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their clients may be held liable for monetary damages.14 It would be particularly
embarrassing for lawyers to make misrepresentations that could cause their clients
additional legal problems transcending those the attorneys were endeavoring to
resolve. Since the adversely affected clients might thereafter sue their culpable
former counsel for legal malpractice, the ultimate injury to the reputations and
practices of the deceptive attorneys could be momentous.15 Legal representatives
who employ clearly improper bargaining tactics may even subject themselves to
judicial sanctions.16
Most legal representatives always conduct their negotiations with appropriate
candor, because they are moral individuals and/or believe that such professional
behavior is mandated by the applicable ethical standards. A few others, however,
do not feel so constrained. These persons should consider the practical risks
associated with disreputable bargaining conduct. Even if their deceitful action is
not reported to the state bar and never results in personal liability for fraud or legal
malpractice, their aberrational behavior is likely to be eventually discovered by
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their fellow practitioners. As other attorneys learn that particular lawyers are not
minimally trustworthy, future interactions become more difficult for those
persons.17 Factual and legal representations are no longer accepted without timeconsuming and expensive verification. Oral agreements on the telephone and
handshake arrangements are no longer acceptable. Executed written documents are
required for even rudimentary transactions. Attorneys who contemplate the
employment of unacceptable deception to further present client interests should
always be cognizant of the fact that their myopic conduct may seriously jeopardize
their future effectiveness. No short-term gain achieved through deviant behavior
should ever be permitted to outweigh the likely long-term consequences of those
improper actions.
When lawyers negotiate, they must constantly decide whether they are going
to divulge relevant legal and/or factual information to opposing counsel. If they
decide to disclose some pertinent information, may they do so partially or is
complete disclosure required? They must also determine the areas they may
permissibly misrepresent and the areas they may not distort.
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A. Nondisclosure of Information.
Even though Model Rule 4.1(a) states that attorneys must be truthful when
they make statements concerning material law or fact, Comment One expressly
indicates that lawyers have "no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of
relevant facts."18 In the absence of special relationships or express contractual or
statutory duties, practitioners are normally not obliged to divulge relevant legal or
factual information to their adversaries.19 This doctrine is premised upon the duty
of representatives to conduct their own legal research and factual investigations.
Under our adversary system, attorneys do not have the right to expect their
opponents to assist them in this regard. It is only when cases reach tribunals that
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) imposes an affirmative obligation on advocates "to disclose
to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer
to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel."20 No such duty is imposed, however, with respect to pertinent factual
circumstances that are not discovered by opposing counsel.
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Suppose attorneys representing a severely injured plaintiff learn, during the
critical stages of settlement talks, that their client has died due to unrelated factors.
Would they be under an ethical duty to disclose this fact to defense counsel who
are clearly assuming continuing pain and suffering and future medical care for the
plaintiff? Although one court held that "plaintiff's attorney clearly had a duty to
disclose the death of his client both to the Court and to opposing counsel prior to
negotiating the [settlement] agreement,”21 this conclusion is not supported by the
Comment to Rule 4.1 pertaining to negotiation discussions. Nonetheless, since the
death of the plaintiff would presumably have necessitated the substitution of
plaintiff’s estate executor, plaintiff counsel may have been under a duty to notify
defense attorneys of this development before concluding any agreement that
would have affected the estate. A similar issue would arise if plaintiff lawyers
learned that their client had miraculously recovered from the serious condition that
provides the basis of the current law suit. If plaintiff attorneys in either of these
situations had previously answered interrogatories concerning the health of the
plaintiff, they would probably be obliged under Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro. 26(e)(2) to
supplement their previous responses.
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A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior
response to an interrogatory, request for production, or
request for admission if the party learns that the response
is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if
the additional or corrective information has not otherwise
been made known to the other parties during the discovery
process or in writing.
Suppose the party possessing the relevant information regarding the plaintiff
is not the plaintiff’s attorney, but rather defense counsel? This issue was
confronted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Spaulding v. Zimmerman.22
Plaintiff Spaulding was injured in an automobile accident when Defendant
Ledermann’s car, in which the Plaintiff was riding, collided with Defendant
Zimmerman’s vehicle. He suffered multiple rib fractures, bilateral fractures of the
clavicles, and a severe cerebral concussion. Several doctors who treated the
Plaintiff concluded that his injuries had completely healed. As the trial date
approached, the defense attorneys had Spaulding examined by a neurologist who
was expected to provide expert testimony for the defense. That physician agreed
that the ribs and clavicles had healed, but discovered a life-threatening aneurysm
on Spaulding’s aorta. Defense counsel were never asked by Plaintiff counsel about
the results of this examination, and the defense lawyers did not volunteer any
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information about it.
A settlement agreement was achieved, which had to be approved by the trial
court since Spaulding was a minor. After the case was settled, Spaulding
discovered the aneurysm, which was surgically repaired, and he sued to set aside
the prior settlement. The trial court vacated the settlement, and this decision was
sustained by the Minnesota Supreme Curt. Despite the fact that most people would
undoubtedly regard an affirmative duty to disclose the crucial information as the
morally appropriate approach, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly determined
that the defense attorneys were under no ethical duty to volunteer the new medical
information to Plaintiff counsel. In fact, without client consent, the confidentiality
preservation obligation imposed by Model Rule 1.6 would preclude volitional
disclosure by defense counsel under these circumstances.23 Comment 5 explicitly
states that “[t]he confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated
in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the
representation, whatever its source.”24
The Spaulding Court circumvented the Rule 1.6 prohibition by holding that
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as officers of the court, defense counsel had an affirmative duty to disclose the
newly discovered medical information to the trial court prior to its approval of the
settlement agreement. Had Spaulding not been a minor, the Court may have had
to enforce the original accord, because of the absence of any trial court
involvement in the settlement process. If courts are unwilling to impose
affirmative disclosure obligations on advocates who possess such critical
information pertaining to opposing clients, they should sustain the resulting
settlement agreements despite the lack of disclosure. This would at least permit
defense lawyers to divulge the negative information as soon as the settlement
terms have been satisfied. By voiding such agreements after plaintiffs learn of the
withheld information, courts effectively require defense attorneys to remain silent
even after the law suits have been finally resolved.
Attorneys can easily avoid these disclosure problems by remembering to ask
the appropriate questions concerning uncertain areas before they enter into
settlement agreements. Defense lawyers can directly ask if the plaintiff’s condition
has changed in any way. Plaintiff representatives could not ethically misrepresent
the material condition of their client. If they were to use evasive techniques to
avoid direct responses, plaintiff lawyers should restate their inquiries and demand
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specific answers. If plaintiff attorneys know that defense counsel have had the
plaintiff examined by a medical expert, they should always ask about the results
of that examination. They should also request a copy of the resulting medical
report, since they are entitled to that information in exchange for the right of
defense counsel to have the plaintiff examined. While defense counsel may merely
confirm what plaintiff lawyers already know, it is possible that plaintiff attorneys
will obtain new information that will affect settlement discussions.
Suppose plaintiff or defense lawyers are on the verge of a law suit settlement
based upon a line of State Supreme Court cases favoring their client. The morning
of the day they are going to conclude their transaction, the State Supreme Court
issues an opinion overturning those beneficial decisions and indicating that the
new rule applies to all pending cases. Would knowledgeable attorneys whose
position has been undermined by these legal changes be obligated to inform their
unsuspecting opponents about these critical judicial developments? Almost all
practitioners asked this question respond in the negative, based on their belief that
opposing counsel are obliged to conduct their own legal research. Sagacious
lawyers would recognize, however, that they could no longer rely upon the
overturned decisions to support their afternoon discussions, because these legal
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misstatements would contravene Rule 4.1. On the other hand, they could probably
ask their unsuspecting adversaries if they could cite a single case supporting their
position!

B. Partial Disclosure of Information.
Negotiators regularly use selective disclosures to enhance their positions.
They divulge the legal doctrines and factual information beneficial to their claims,
while withholding circumstances that are not helpful. In most instances, these
selective disclosures are expected by opponents and are considered an inherent
aspect of bargaining interactions. When attorneys emphasize their strengths,
opposing counsel must attempt to ascertain their undisclosed weaknesses. They
should carefully listen for verbal leaks and look for nonverbal signals that may
indicate the existence of possible opponent problems. Probing questions may be
used to elicit some negative information, and external research may be employed
to gather other relevant data. These efforts are particularly important when
opponents carefully limit their disclosures to favorable circumstances, since their
partial disclosures may cause listeners to make erroneous assumptions.
When I discuss negotiating ethics with legal practitioners, I often ask if
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lawyers are obliged to disclose information to correct erroneous factual or legal
assumptions made by opposing counsel. Most respondents perceive no duty to
correct legal or factual misunderstandings generated solely by the carelessness of
opposing attorneys. Respondents only hesitate when opponent misperceptions may
have resulted from misinterpretations of seemingly honest statements made by
them. For example, when a plaintiff attorney embellishes the pain being
experienced by a client with a severely sprained ankle, the defense lawyer may
indicate how painful broken ankles can be. If the plaintiff representative has said
nothing to create this false impression, should he or she be obliged to correct the
obvious defense counsel error? Although a respectable minority of respondents
believe that an affirmative duty to correct the misperception may exist here -- due
to the fact plaintiff embellishments may have inadvertently contributed to the
misunderstanding -- most respondents feel no such obligation. So long as they
have not directly generated the erroneous belief, it is not their duty to correct it.
They could not, however, include their opponent’s misunderstanding in their own
statements, since this would cause them to improperly articulate knowing
misrepresentations of material fact.
When opponent misperceptions concern legal doctrines, almost no
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respondents perceive a duty to correct those misconceptions. They indicate that
each side is obliged to conduct its own legal research. If opposing counsel make
incorrect assumptions or carelessly fail to locate applicable statutes or cases, those
advocates do not have the right to expect their adversaries to provide them with
legal assistance. The more knowledgeable advocates may even continue to rely on
precedents supporting their own claims, so long as they do not distort those
decisions or the opinions supporting the other side’s positions.
Under some circumstances, partial answers may mislead opposing counsel as
effectively as direct misrepresentations. For example, the Plaintiff in Spaulding
v. Zimmerman,25 discussed in Section A, sustained cracked ribs and fractured
clavicles in an automobile accident. After the ribs and clavicles had healed, the
defense lawyers had the Plaintiff examined by their own medical expert who
detected an aorta aneurysm that Plaintiff attorneys did not know about. While
defense counsel were probably under no ethical obligation to voluntarily disclose
existence of the aneurysm and they could use evasive responses to avoid
answering opponent inquiries regarding the Plaintiff’s condition, they could not
overtly misrepresent their physician’s findings by stating that the Plaintiff was in
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perfect health. Could Defendant attorneys respond to Plaintiff counsel questions
by indicating that “the ribs and the clavicles have healed nicely?” Would this
partial disclosure constitute a deliberate misrepresentation of material fact,
because the Defendant lawyers realize that Plaintiff counsel are interpreting this
statement in a more expansive manner? Most practitioners have indicated that they
would refuse to provide partial responses that would mislead Plaintiff counsel into
believing the Plaintiff had completely recovered. While they could decline to
answer questions regarding the Plaintiff’s health, they should not be permitted to
provide partial responses they know will deceive Plaintiff counsel. Nonetheless,
recipients of answers limited to such specific conditions should become suspicious
and ask follow-up inquiries about other problems that may have been discovered.

C. Overt Misrepresentation of Information.
When lawyers are asked if negotiators may overtly misrepresent legal or
factual matters, most immediately reply in the negative. Many cite Model Rule 4.1
and suggest that this prohibition covers all intentional misrepresentations. While
they are correct with respect to deliberate misstatements concerning material legal
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doctrines, they are not entirely correct with respect to factual issues. Almost all
negotiators expect opponents to engage in "puffing" and "embellishment."
Advocates who hope to obtain $50,000 settlements may initially insist upon
$150,000 or even $200,000. They may also embellish the pain experienced by
their client, so long as their exaggerations do not transcend the bounds of expected
propriety. Individuals involved in a corporate buy out may initially over or under
value the real property, the building and equipment, the inventory, the accounts
receivable, the patent rights and trademarks, and the good will of the pertinent
firm.
It is clear that lawyers may not intentionally misrepresent material facts, but
it is not always apparent what facts are "material." The previously noted Comment
to Rule 4.1 explicitly acknowledges that "estimates of price or value placed on the
subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of
a claim" do not constitute "material" facts under that provision. It is thus ethical
for legal negotiators to misrepresent the value their client places on particular
items. For example, attorneys representing one spouse involved in a marital
dissolution may indicate that their client wants joint custody of the children, when
he or she does not. Lawyers representing a party attempting to purchase a
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particular company may understate their client's belief regarding the value of the
good will associated with the target firm. So long as the statement conveys their
side’s belief -- and does not falsely indicate the view of an outside expert, such as
an accountant -- no Rule 4.1 violation would occur.
Legal negotiators may also misrepresent client settlement intentions. They
may ethically suggest to opposing counsel that an outstanding offer is
unacceptable, even though they know the proposed terms would be accepted if no
additional concessions could be generated. Nonetheless, it is important to
emphasize that this Rule 4.1 exception does not wholly excuse all misstatements
regarding client settlement intentions. During the early stages of bargaining
interactions, most practitioners do not expect opponents to disclose exact client
desires. As negotiators approach final agreements, however, they anticipate a
greater degree of candor. If negotiators were to deliberately deceive adversaries
about this issue during the closing stage of their interaction, most attorneys would
consider them dishonest, even though the Rule 4.1 proscription would remain
inapplicable.
The relevant Comment to Rule 4.1 is explicitly restricted to negotiations with
opposing counsel. Outside that narrow setting, statements pertaining to client
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settlement objectives may constitute “material” fact. ABA Formal Opin. 93-370
(1993) indicated that knowing misrepresentations regarding client settlement
intentions to judges during pretrial settlement discussions would be impermissible,
because the misstatements would not be confined to adversarial bargaining
interactions.26
When material facts are involved, attorneys may not deliberately misrepresent
the actual circumstances. They may employ evasive techniques to avoid answering
opponent questions, but they may not provide false or misleading answers. If they
decide to respond to inquiries pertaining to material facts, they must do so
honestly. They must also be careful not to issue partially correct statements they
know will be misinterpreted by their opponents, since such deliberate deception
would be likely to contravene Rule 4.1
A crucial distinction is drawn between statements of lawyer opinion and
statements of material fact. When attorneys merely express their opinions -- e.g.,
“I think the defendant had consumed too much alcohol”; “I believe the plaintiff
will encounter future medical difficulties” -- they are not constrained by Rule 4.1.
Opposing counsel know that these recitations only concern the personal views of
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27

the speakers. These statements are critically different from lawyer statements
indicating that they have witnesses who can testify to these matters. If
representations regarding witness information is knowingly false, the
misstatements would clearly violate Rule 4.1.
A frequently debated area concerns representations about one's authorized
limits. Many attorneys refuse to answer "unfair" questions concerning their
authorized limits, because these inquiries pertain to confidential attorney-client
communications. If negotiators decide to respond to these queries, must they do
so honestly? Some lawyers believe that truthful responses are required, since they
concern material facts. Other practitioners assert that responses about client
authorizations merely reflect client valuations and settlement intentions and are
thus excluded from the scope of Rule 4.1 by the drafter's Comment. As a result,
they think that attorneys may distort these matters.27
Negotiators who know they cannot avoid the impact of questions concerning
their authorized limits by labeling them “unfair” and who find it difficult to
provide knowingly false responses can employ an alternative approach. If the
plaintiff lawyer who is demanding $120,000 asks the defendant attorney who is
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presently offering $85,000 whether he or she is authorized to provide $100,000,
the recipient may treat the $100,000 figure as a new plaintiff proposal. That
individual can reply that the $100,000 sum suggested by plaintiff counsel is more
realistic but still exorbitant. The plaintiff attorney may become preoccupied with
the need to clarify the fact that he or she did not intend to suggest any reduction
in his or her outstanding $120,000 demand. That person would probably forego
further attempts to ascertain the authorized limits possessed by the defendant
attorney!

III. UNCONSCIONABLE TACTICS AND AGREEMENTS
In recent years, a number of legal representatives -- especially in large urban
areas -- have decided to employ highly offensive tactics to advance client interests.
They may be rude, sarcastic, or nasty. These individuals erroneously equate
discourteous actions with effective advocacy. They use these techniques as a
substitute for lawyering skill. Proficient practitioners recognize that impolite
behavior is the antithesis of competent representation.
Legal representatives should eschew tactics that are merely designed to
humiliate or harass opponents. ABA Model Rule 4.4 expressly states that “a
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lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person ....”28 Demented win-lose negotiators
occasionally endeavor to achieve total annihilation of adversaries through the
cruel and unnecessary degradation of opposing counsel. When advocates obtain
munificent settlement terms for their client, there is no reason for them to employ
tactics intended to discomfort their adversaries. Not only is such behavior morally
reprehensible, but it needlessly exposes the offensive perpetrators to future
recriminations that could easily be avoided through common courtesy. This
approach also guarantees the offensive actors far more nonsettlements than are
experienced by their more cooperative cohorts, and it tends to generate less
efficient bargaining distributions.
Many practicing attorneys seem to think that competitive/adversarial
negotiators -- who use highly competitive tactics to maximize their own client
returns -- achieve more beneficial results for their clients than their
cooperative/problem-solving colleagues -- who employ more cooperative
techniques designed to maximize the joint return to the parties involved. This
notion was contradicted by an empirical study conducted by Professor Gerald
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Williams of legal practitioners in Denver and Phoenix. He found that 65 percent
of negotiators were considered cooperative/problem-solvers by their peers, 24
percent were viewed as competitive/adversarial, and 11 percent did not fit in either
category.29 When the respondents were asked to indicate which attorneys were
“effective,” “average,” and “ineffective” negotiators, the results were striking.
While 59 percent of the cooperative/problem-solving lawyers were rated
“effective,” only 25 percent of competitive/adversarial attorneys were.30 On the
other hand, while a mere 3 percent of cooperative/problem-solvers were
considered “ineffective,” 33 percent of competitive/adversarial bargainers were.
In his study, Professor Williams found that certain traits were shared by both
effective

cooperative/problem-solving

negotiators

and

effective

competitive/adversarial bargainers.31 Successful negotiators from both groups are
thoroughly prepared, behave in an honest and ethical manner, are perceptive
readers of opponent cues, are analytical, realistic, and convincing, and observe the
courtesies of the bar. The proficient negotiators from both groups also sought to
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maximize their own client’s return. Since this is the quintessential characteristic
of competitive/adversarial bargainers, it would suggest that a number of successful
negotiators may be adroitly masquerading as sheep in wolves’ clothing. They
exude a cooperative style, but seek competitive objectives.
Most successful negotiators are able to combine the most salient traits
associated with the cooperative/problem-solving and the competitive/adversarial
styles.32 They endeavor to maximize client returns, but attempt to accomplish this
objective in a congenial and seemingly ingenuous manner.33 They look for shared
values in recognition of the fact that by maximizing joint returns, they are more
likely to obtain the best settlements for their own clients. Although they try to
manipulate opponent perceptions, they rarely resort to truly deceitful tactics. They
know that a loss of credibility will undermine their ability to achieve beneficial
results. Despite the fact they want as much as possible for their own clients, they
are not “win-lose” negotiators who judge their results, not by how well they have
done, but by how poorly they think their opponents have done.. They realize that
the imposition of poor terms on opponents does not necessarily benefit their own
32
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clients. All factors being equal, they want to maximize opponent satisfaction. So
long as it does not require significant concessions on their part, they acknowledge
the benefits to be derived from this approach. The more satisfied opponents are,
the more likely those parties are to accept proposed terms and to honor the
resulting agreements.
These eclectic negotiators employ a composite style. They may be
characterized as competitive/problem-solvers. They seek competitive goals
(maximum client returns), but endeavor to accomplish those objectives through
problem-solving strategies.34 They exude a cooperative approach and follow the
courtesies of the legal profession. They avoid rude or inconsiderate behavior,
recognizing that such openly adversarial conduct is likely to generate
competitive/adversarial responses from their opponents. They appreciate the fact
that individuals who employ wholly inappropriate tactics almost always induce
opposing counsel to work harder to avoid exploitation by these openly
opportunistic bargainers. Legal negotiators who are contemplating the use of
offensive techniques should simply ask themselves how they would react if similar
tactics were employed against them.
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Rule 4.3 of the 1980 Discussion Draft of the ABA Model Rules would have
instructed attorneys not to conclude any agreement “the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know ... would be held to be unconscionable as a matter of
law.”35 This provision would have substantially satisfied the admonition of Judge
Rubin against the negotiation of “unconscionable deals.”36 Nonetheless, this
proposal was omitted from the final draft, most likely because of its superfluous
nature. If negotiated contracts are “unconscionable as a matter of law,” they are
be subject to legal challenges that may vitiate the entire transactions. It thus
behooves legal advocates to avoid the consummation of truly unconscionable
accords.
What about seemingly one-sided arrangements that have not been procured
through improper means and do not constitute legally unconscionable agreements?
Should it be considered unethical or morally reprehensible for attorneys to
negotiate such contracts? This concept would place the responsible advocates in
a tenuous position. If courts would be unlikely to find the proposed agreements
illegal and the opposing parties were perfectly willing to consummate the
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apparently skewed transactions, should the prevailing legal representatives refuse
to conclude the deals merely because they believe the transactions may
unreasonably disadvantage their opponents? Why should the subjective personal
judgments of these lawyers take precedence over the willingness of their
opponents and their attorneys to conclude the proposed exchanges? These
individuals may not know -- and may never know -- why their opponents
considered these deals “fair.” Their adversaries may have been aware of factual
or legal circumstances that either undermined their own positions or bolstered
those of the other side.
Some lawyers might reasonably feel compelled to mention the apparently onesided aspect of suggested transactions to their own clients. A few might even feel
the need to explore this concern at least obliquely with opposing counsel. Would
it be appropriate for them to refuse to consummate the agreements even when the
other participants still favor their execution? If they continued to sanctimoniously
oppose the proposed deals, should they be subject to bar discipline for failing to
represent their client with appropriate zeal or to liability for legal malpractice?
Attorneys who are positioned to conclude lawful arrangements that would
substantially benefit their clients should be hesitant to vitiate the transactions
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based solely on their own personal conviction that the proffered terms are “unfair”
to their opponents. How many lawyers in these circumstances would inform their
clients that they were unwilling to accept offers tendered by opposing parties in
response to wholly proper bargaining tactics, merely because they thought the
proposed terms were too generous?
Practitioners and law students occasionally ask whether lawyers who represent
clients in civil actions arising out of arguably criminal conduct may suggest the
possibility of criminal prosecution if the civil suit negotiations are not completed
successfully. DR 7-105(A) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, that
is still followed by some jurisdictions, states that lawyers shall not "threaten to
present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter."37 This
provision might be read to preclude the mention of possible criminal action to
advance civil suit discussions. Courts have appropriately acknowledged, however,
that neither DR 7-105(A) nor extortion or compounding of felony prohibitions
should be interpreted to prevent civil litigants from mentioning the availability of
criminal action if related civil claims are not resolved or to preclude clients from
agreeing to forego the filing of criminal charges in exchange for money paid to
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resolve their civil suits.38 Nonetheless, legal representatives must be careful not to
use the threat of criminal prosecution to obtain more than is owed or have their
clients agree not to testify at future criminal trials. "Seeking payment beyond
restitution in exchange for foregoing criminal prosecution or seeking any
payments in exchange for not testifying at a criminal trial . . . are still clearly
prohibited."39
The Model Rules do not contain any provision analogous to DR 7-105(A), and
it is clear that the drafters deliberately chose not to prohibit the threat of criminal
action to advance civil suit settlement talks pertaining to the same operative
circumstances.40 As a result, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility indicated in Formal Opinion 92-363 (1992), that it is
not unethical under the Model Rules for attorneys to mention the possibility of
criminal charges during civil suit negotiations, so long as they do "not attempt to
exert or suggest improper influence over the criminal process."41 Nevertheless,
legal representatives must still not demand excessive compensation that may
38
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contravene applicable extortion provisions or promise that their clients will not
testify at future criminal trials.

IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Despite the contrary impression of some members of the general public, I have
generally found attorneys to be conscientious and honorable people. I have
encountered few instances of questionable behavior. I would thus like to conclude
with the admonitions I impart to my Legal Negotiating students as they prepare
to enter the legal profession. Lawyers must remember that they have to live with
their own consciences, and not those of their clients or their partners. They must
employ tactics they are comfortable using, even in those situations in which other
people encourage them to employ less reputable behavior. If they adopt techniques
they do not consider appropriate, not only will they experience personal
discomfort, but they will also fail to achieve their intended objective due to the
fact they will not appear credible when using those tactics. Attorneys must also
acknowledge that they are members of a special profession and owe certain duties
to the public that transcend those that may be owed by people engaged in other
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businesses.42 Even though ABA Model Rule 1.3 states that “[a] lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence,” Comment 1 expressly recognizes that “a lawyer is not
bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer
has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter shall be
pursued.”43
Popular negotiation books occasionally recount the successful use of
questionable techniques to obtain short-term benefits. The authors glibly describe
the way they have employed highly aggressive, deliberately deceptive, or equally
opprobrious bargaining tactics to achieve their objectives. They usually conclude
these stories with parenthetical admissions that their bilked adversaries would
probably be reluctant to interact with them in the future. When negotiators engage
in such questionable behavior that they would find it difficult, if not impossible,
to transact future business with their adversaries, they have usually transcended
the bounds of propriety. No legal representatives should be willing to jeopardize
long-term professional relationships for the narrow interests of particular clients.
Zealous representation should never be thought to require the employment of
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personally compromising techniques.
Lawyers must acknowledge that they are not guarantors -- they are only legal
advocates. They are not supposed to guarantee client victory no matter how
disreputably they must act to do so. They should never countenance witness
perjury or the withholding of subpoenaed documents. While they should zealously
endeavor to advance client interests, they should recognize their moral obligation
to follow the ethical rules applicable to all attorneys.
Untrustworthy advocates encounter substantial difficulty when they negotiate
with others. Their oral representations must be verified and reduced to writing,
and many opponents distrust their written documents. Negotiations are especially
problematic and cumbersome. If nothing else moves practitioners to behave in an
ethical and dignified manner, their hope for long and successful legal careers
should induce them to avoid conduct that may undermine their future
effectiveness.
Attorneys should diligently strive to advance client objectives while
simultaneously maintaining their personal integrity. This philosophy will enable
them to optimally serve the interests of both their clients and society. Legal
practitioners who are asked about their insistence on ethical behavior may take

40

refuge in an aphorism of Mark Twain: “Always do right. This will gratify some
people, and astonish the rest!”

